This article explores how 'European civilization' was imagined on the margins of Europe in the first half of the twentieth century, and how Balkan intellectuals saw their own societies' place in it in the context of interwar crises and WWII occupation. It traces the interwar development and wartime transformation of the intellectual debates regarding the modernization of Serbia/Yugoslavia, the role of the Balkans in the broader European culture, and the most appropriate path to becoming a member of the 'European family of nations.' In the first half of the article, I focus on the inter-war Serbian intelligentsia, and their discussions of various forms of international cultural, political and civilizational links and settings. These discussions centrally addressed the issue of Yugoslavia's (and Serbia's) 'Europeanness' and cultural identity in the context of the East-West symbolic and the state's complex cultural-historical legacies. Such debates demonstrated how frustrating the goal of Westernization and Europeanization turned out to be for Serbian intellectuals. After exploring the conundrums and seemingly insoluble contradictions of interwar modernization/Europeanization discussions, the article then goes on to analyze the dramatic changes in such intellectual outlooks after 1941, asking how Europe and European cultural/political integration were imagined in occupied Serbia, and whether the realities of the occupation could accommodate these earlier debates. Serbia can provide an excellent case study for exploring how the brutal Nazi occupation policies affected collaborationist governments, and how the latter tried to make sense of their troubled inclusion in the racial ideology of the New European Order under the German leadership. Was Germany's propaganda regarding European camaraderie taken seriously by any of the local actors? What did the Third Reich's dubious internationalism mean in the east and south-east of Europe, and did it have anything to offer to the intelligentsia as well as the population at large?
the government's demands, suggestions, complaints were regularly rebuffed and its authorizations increasingly limited, to the point of turning it into an administrative tool of the German command. And yet, the very existence of a seemingly autonomous governmental body with its own organs, propaganda channels and certain ideological precepts created a situation in which there emerged official and more or less articulately formulated local responses to various aspects of the Third Reich's ideology.
For these reasons, Serbia can provide an excellent case study for exploring how the brutal Nazi occupation policies affected collaborationist governments, and how the latter tried to make sense of their troubled inclusion in the racial ideology of the New European Order under the German leadership. Was Germany's propaganda regarding European camaraderie taken seriously by any of the local actors?
it have anything to offer to the intelligentsia as well as the population at large in the occupied territories?
In the recent years, the phenomenon of Axis internationalism began to receive some historiographical attention, and several studies have dealt with Nazi Germany's attempts to develop the image of a collaborative and inclusive 'New Europe'. These attempts included efforts to set up transnational networks and organizations to replace the liberal ones, as well as building up a discourse of European solidarity and unity, which aimed to dispel the notion that the Nazi New Order meant German dominance but portrayed it as a proper (and truly international) alternative to the dated plutocratic liberal-democratic system of international relations. 9 While historians have addressed certain aspects of the Third Reich's elaborations on Axis internationalism, very few accounts have explored how various occupied states responded to this new concept of Europe. In particular, it still remains largely unclear how the occupied territories in the Balkans and Eastern Europe understood their own place in the New
Europe and how they resolved the major contradiction between the Nazi talk of Europeanization and the extreme brutality of their occupation policies. This is the historiographical lacuna which this article aims to fill. It explores how a Balkan government under severe military occupation responded to the 'Europeanization' of the Nazi rhetoric, to rhetorical as well as practical inconsistencies that abounded in the Nazi treatment of the South-Eastern territories, and how it made sense of the Untermenschen campaigns that, among others, directly targeted the Serbian population. It also aims to find out how all these various factors and arguments were negotiated into the local context, adapted to local needs and purposes and combined with some already existing concepts and debates. Answers to all these questions can help us better understand the nature, credibility and extent of the Third Reich's European project on the continent's margins. As this article will demonstrate, regardless of the incoherence and insincerity of the Nazi internationalism, the New Europe was an idea which gained some credence even among those populations, the assertion of whose inferiority constituted the ideological core of National Socialism's vision of Europe and the world.
In this article, therefore, I trace the interwar development and wartime transformation of the political and intellectual debates regarding the modernization of Serbia/Yugoslavia, the role of the Balkans in the broader European civilization, and the most appropriate path to becoming a member of the 'European family of nations.' In the first half of the article, I primarily focus on the inter-war Serbian intelligentsia, and their discussions of various forms of international cultural, political and civilizational links and settings. These discussions centrally addressed the issue of Yugoslavia's (and Serbia's)
'Europeanness' and cultural identity in the context of the state's complex cultural-historical legacies.
This part of the article examines the pronouncements of mainstream liberal intellectuals and public
figures, but then also traces the development of far-right intellectual and political discussions, offering historical background to the Serbian collaborationist intellectuals' debates during the WWII occupation which are considered in the second half of the article. After exploring the conundrums of interwar modernization/Europeanization discussions, I go on to analyze the dramatic changes in such intellectual outlooks after 1941, asking how Europe and European cultural/political integration were imagined in occupied Serbia, and whether the realities of the occupation could accommodate these earlier debates.
While the conceptualization of the East-West relationship as one of cultural/civilizational inferiority and superiority emerged as the dominant discourse and the founding assumption of the prewar debates, a major aspect of the wartime discussions seemed to be the dissolution of this overarching dichotomy. This occurred primarily due to the political context, and the necessity to express support for Germany's policies, goals and alliances and to follow the lead of the Nazi propaganda. When these pressing policy issues, as well as the influence of the Nazi rhetoric of European harmony, unity and solidarity, combined with the already existing local conceptual framework, the basic prewar assumptions appeared to break up and a different approach to the problem of Serbia's role in the European context began to form. As Yves Durand argues, the 'banner of the construction of the 'New Europe' and the 'Crusade against Bolshevism'' in protection of Europe's core civilizational values were rhetorical motives common to virtually all collaborating regimes in Nazi Europe. 10 Building on such
German propaganda discourses, the Serbian government also continued to address one of the central turning it into an abode of 'shadows and cemeteries.' 20 Ataturk was indeed the ultimate symbol of modern national politics and contemporary -Western -cultural trends, which this group of Yugoslav intellectuals aimed to emulate, and this discourse explicitly refused to acknowledge that Ottoman historical and cultural legacies might have had any lasting civilizational value: they were at best mere, often bizarre, museum curiosities.
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The hitherto cherished culture -patriarchal traditions, oriental in their essence, and therefore civilizationally inferior -was to be abandoned, and the distinct spiritual character 'as expressed throughout history' was, paradoxically, to be built anew, in clear separation from that very history. For instance, in his essay on the nature of language and verse in Serbian literature and poetry, Stanislav
Vinaver argued that the main obstacle on the path of joining modern European civilization and reaching Europe's artistic standards was the outdated, epic language and decasyllabic rhythm of South Slav literature. According to Vinaver, even modern literature in Serbia and Yugoslavia retained this 'language of patriarchal villages' and their epic poetry, which could no more express the nuances and abstractions of modern individuality. Vinaver proposed a thorough modernization of the language, and replacing decasyllabic verses with the modern language of Westernized cities such as Belgrade. 22 But it was unclear where the sought for 'authenticity of the national expression' would be located.
Yugoslavia's art and culture was becoming 'indissolubly bound in the ties of western example and has not yet succeeded in assimilating sufficient local influences to raise it to the status of a separate school with distinct ethnic and national characteristics which would serve to mark it out as a distinctive group within the sphere of western civilization.' 23 Even worse, it was in the phase of 'an absolute reliance upon, and assimilation of, western tendencies without struggle and without opposition' -it was turning into a mindless imitator.
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Under the circumstances, many authors attempted to resolve the modernization and authenticity conundrum by positing, somewhat awkwardly, that Eastern influences were just a "thin veneer," temporarily superimposed on a profoundly Western character of the Balkans generally, and
Yugoslavia more specifically, and invested major efforts into proving the 'essentially' European nature of the Serbian culture. 25 This was suggested most ominously through a variety of increasingly popular anthropological and ethnological racial arguments, such as Branimir Males' thesis that, by its biological constitution, Yugoslavia's 'Dinaric race,' unlike other East European -'Asiatic' -peoples, was genetically tied to the Nordic racial group. 26 The entire Dinaric debate, inspired partly by the ethnological and geographical research and writings of the celebrated Serbian anthropogeographer Jovan Cvijic, purported to prove not only that the Yugoslav 'race' existed biologically, well before the creation of the (increasingly dysfunctional) Yugoslav state, but also directly countered Central and West European anthropological, psychiatric and ethnographic arguments regarding the 'primitivism'
and 'brutality' of eastern Slavs. 27 According to the head of Yugoslavia's Central Hygiene Institute in
Belgrade, Stevan Ivanic, even though the 'purest types' of the Nordic race could be found in Sweden or Norway, it was very well spread among 'Baltic Aryans and Slavs.' 28 The increasingly influential right-wing discourse on biological races and racism offered a simple solution to the issue of identity, backwardness and modernisation within the East-West binary, by constructing a distinction between biological 'essences' -which supposedly tied the populations of the Balkans and Yugoslavia firmly to the advanced Western civilisation -and fickle historical, environmental factors. However, as historian Olivera Milosavljevic correctly noted, Yugoslavia's racial theorists had one remarkable problem with the National Socialist brand of racism: it 'glorified the "Nordic" race and neglected the value of the "Dinaric" race.' In response, the Yugoslav and Serbian racial theory of the 1930s vehemently denied the Dinaric race's purported inferiority, and thus encountered a conundrum very similar to that tackled by interwar liberal intellectuals, artists and scientists. It attempted to resolve it in a variety of ways: it sought to prove the extraordinary role of the Dinaric racial type in the advancement of the global and European civilisations, to posit a fundamental compatibility between the Nordic and Dinaric racial groups -so that their mixing resulted in a 'high quality' of the offspring -and ultimately to insist on their extreme proximity or even complete identity. 29 Moreover, Males even claimed that 'Dinaroids'
were both intellectually and physically superior to and 'more authentically European' than either the Mediterranean or the Nordic 'races.' For Svetislav Stefanovic, similarly, the Dinaric type was by the end of the 1930s in fact preferable to the previously dominant yet rapidly declining Nordic racial group: he speculated that the Nordic race might have fulfilled its historical mission and was quickly losing its leadership qualities, and should therefore be replaced by the Dinaric man, who carried fresh ideas for social, cultural and political re-organisation. 30 In a similar vein, Anthropologist Vladimir Dvornikovic saw the Dinaric race as 'the most manly of all European races', and the embodiment of the male warrior type. 31 
Searching for alternatives to the Western model in the interwar period
The difficulty facing all those who attempted to resolve the problem of modernization within Marxist-Freudian intellectuals proposed to Balkanize Europe and thereby protect it from rotting under the burden of its own cultured cruelty. They in fact "converted a presumed Balkan cultural deficiency into a Barbarian virtue" and rejected the West's "excessive rationality," contrasting it with the Balkan "eruption of the inner need for liberation." 32 Relying on a particular reading of Freud, they forged the concept of Barbarogenius -a raw but youthful and energetic Balkan man, a primordial force capable of healing and 'revaluing', an irrational yet creative being -which stood at the core of their critique.
The redemptive Barbarogenius, the very opposite of Western civilization, its education, manners and high culture, had the unique power to heal European 'pseudoculture', to 'decivilize' it and save it from certain decline by 'fertilizing' it with fresh and healthy blood. 33 The construction of this figure thus served to subvert the interwar discourse of the Balkans as the 'Orient of Europe,' and the extreme irreverence served the purpose beautifully. As famous poet Rade Drainac said, 'We have had enough of licking the boots of Catholicism, the Pope in Rome and the Gallic waves of Paris!' 34 The most relevant for the direction of the modernization debates during WWII was a group of public intellectuals, state functionaries and scholars who gradually moved towards right-wing and farright organizations such as Dimitrije Ljotic's Yugoslav Nationalist Movement, also known as Zbor (Rally). This was a pro-fascistic yet highly conservative political association, which received steady financial and political support from Germany since its foundation in 1935, and which espoused an extreme anti-Communist, anti-liberal and anti-individualist ideological programme. Zbor was a marginal political phenomenon in the interwar years, and did not succeed in receiving more than 1% of electoral support throughout the 1930s. 35 However, Ljotic and his close political associates were to become the decisive political factor during the subsequent Nazi occupation of Serbia. Zbor advocated a return to the archaic cultural and religious traditions of the Yugoslav nation, and heavily criticised the political course and influence of Western democracies; unsurprisingly, this ideological stance profoundly shaped its adherents' contributions to the modernisation debates.
Some of the Zbor sympathisers were gathered around Belgrade's Balkan Institute, while others were prominent writers and public figures such as famous interwar authors Vladimir Vujic, Stanislav
Krakov, Vladimir Velmar-Jankovic. 36 They attempted to offer an alternative view of the Balkans'
Ottoman historical legacy, thereby disputing the narrative of the West's absolute and well-deserved supremacy. 37 These dissenting discourses also bitterly opposed Western Europe's long-lasting intellectual practices of 'cultural othering' with regard to Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Orient in general. 38 Svetozar Spanacevic, a co-founder of the Institute and an important political figure in the subsequent wartime collaborationist regime, for instance, viewed the political and cultural legacies of the East as remarkable and positive in themselves, arguing that they constituted an integral part of the most advanced achievements of contemporary civilization and a cultural and historical heritage from which the West could even learn. 39 At times, he seemed to speak directly to those participants in the Yugoslav modernization debates who had internalized such a distorted image of their own region, 'who were ashamed of their nationality' and even 'felt hurt if they were called Balkanians.' 40 What the Ottoman power contributed to the cultures of the Balkan Christians was not merely invasion and destruction: they also brought with them 'the Moslem ideal of the protection of the weak and the poor, and introduced many benevolent social institutions. The Turks gave the Balkans the eastern urbane civilisation with its public institutions,... They taught the Balkanians that neighbour should be respected more than a relative, thereby creating the necessary basis for religious and social tolerance.'
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Thus, while the cultural core of the Balkans was notably different from many Western legacies and traditions, Spanacevic by no means saw the 'East' to be civilizationally subordinated to the Occident.
Nor was there ever a fundamental, unbridgeable gap, an essential incompatibility between the two cultures that would require the Balkan region to relinquish one altogether in order to become an honourable member of the other (particularly because, in his opinion, some of the 'Eastern' contributions were to be found at the historical roots of the Western traditions). Velmar-Jankovic went a step further, arguing that Balkan people were not Europeans and neither were they striving to be, because they had, fortunately, been shielded from European civilizational influences (such as Humanism and Renaissance) by the long Ottoman rule, and had instead been shaped by different, more valuable cultural values. 42 In the years following the disintegration of Yugoslavia and its occupation by the Axis powers, it was precisely these and similar views that would gain prominence and re-define the core terms of the Europeanization and modernization debates. eagerness to import and imitate foreign political ideologies and systems. For interwar fascist theoretician Danilo Gregoric, the failure of 'pseudo-liberal' states was evident not only in Yugoslavia but across the whole of Europe; on the other hand, national regeneration could only happen on authentic national principles, and political state needed to be a true expression of the unique national spirit of each people. 44 If political structures were expressions of the national character and consciousness, Yugoslav politicians, intellectuals, sociologists and economists would have to think hard about 'which forms would be best suited for our own nation to achieve its national regeneration.' 'We have our own medicine for our own illness', urged Ljotic. Velibor Jonic, who later became the Minister of Education in the Serbian collaborationist government, lamented in 1935 that the conundrum facing the Yugoslavs was that 'they had not participated in creating the European civilisation but are being forced to pay for its debts.' 45 Jonic believed that the country was pushed to choose 'between Europe and Asia', but that the only right answer was to focus on the authentic national traditions. In the paramount civilisational clash they were witnessing, the Yugoslavs would need to select neither side if they were to survive.
In Zbor's interpretation, this politics of national authenticity necessitated the realisation of the 'organic' national regeneration of Yugoslavia on a peasant basis, which would make it possible for her to finally assume a 'dignified place in the New European Order.' It was only through this unashamed return to the ethnic, 'tribal' and primordial folkloric traditions that Yugoslavia could gain any semblance of respectability and dignity in an international context. The pro-fascist right in the 1930s celebrated the (Serbian) countryside and its cultural-political role in a new Yugoslav community: 'the peasant mentality and peasant culture will ensure the white race's predominance over the other existing races, and will become a bastion against which all imperialist and destructive ways will break.' 46 If Yugoslavia (or Serbia) were to join the European family of nations on an equal footing, this could not be done by mindlessly copying political formulae suited to different national characters and consciousness; instead, the peasant culture was meant to become the founding block of the state and the 'source of national life'
and authenticity. 47 As we will see below, the outbreak of the war cemented the ideological platform of the right wing. They mourned what they saw as the tragic short-sightedness of the organisers of the March 1941 coup, which overthrew the Yugoslav government three days after it signed accession to the Tripartite Pact and provoked Germany's assault in early April. In 1942, well into the occupation, Gregoric lamented this missed opportunity, claiming that the only way for Yugoslavia to become a respectable member of the international community and a significant factor in the Southeast of Europe was to side with Germany politically, because the 'new face of Europe' demanded a recalibration of international relations. 48 In similar vein, Stefanovic claimed that a new, more socially just European order had offered
Yugoslavia an unprecedented opportunity for future growth, political importance and success, and guaranteed its honour and borders, but that the internal enemies had decided to ally the country with the decaying West and plunge it into a disaster. During the occupation years, this rejection of the West European model of modernity and progress marked the political discourse, as collaborationist intellectuals searched for ideological solutions beyond the East-West binary.
Dissolving the boundary: The occupation regime 1941-1944
The German regime in rump Serbia implemented some of the most brutal occupation policies and practices in the entire Nazi Europe. The cumulative effects of forced labor, detention and execution of the 'politically unreliable,' constant economic exploitation and food requisitioning were severely worsened by the harsh reprisals in response to the developing armed rebellion of the Communist and nationalist forces. The initial German plan not to set up a collaborationist regime with political and governmental duties needed to be changed as the situation with the guerrilla resistance deteriorated and no further reinforcement of the German troops in Serbia was allowed due to the Eastern front demands.
In that context, the originally installed purely administrative body functioning under the firm German auspices proved inefficient, and what was suggested was 'reorganizing and strengthening the Serbian administration so that the Serbs themselves might crush the rebellion.' truly be said that it had its own policies in any field of government activity. It was simply an auxiliary organ of the German occupation regime.' 50 Distrusted by the political and SS elements in the Nazi apparatus, the government's activity was largely reduced to low-level administration, pro-German propaganda efforts and pointing out to the population the futility of any anti-German operations.
Under such circumstances, Serbia's political and intellectual elites needed to express their unswerving loyalty to Germany's mission and uncompromisingly side with it in strategic military and political terms. Regardless of anyone's 'genuine' ideological convictions, it was crucial for Nedic's entourage to gain the trust of the German authorities in South East Europe and Berlin. In Serbian wartime journals and newspapers, therefore, one of the most frequent motifs was the defamation of Great Britain and its conduct in political as well as cultural and civilizational terms. 51 However, as we saw, the crux of the prewar discourse on Europe and Yugoslavia's/Serbia's place in it depended in a very important sense on the positive evaluation of Great Britain's cultural, political, and civilizational role. England for all purposes came to symbolize both the 'West' itself, which became the all-pervasive political and cultural goal of the intellectual mainstream in the 1930s, as well as Serbia's purported 'Western national essence' (or at least the ability to acquire it), its undeniable belonging to the 'advanced family.' If this paradigmatic Western culture was not superior by default anymore, this had to have consequences on how the 'East,' the second part of the disintegrating dichotomy, was to be approached. From the very start of the occupation, articles abounded which warned against the 'shameful, deadly alliance of the Judeo-Masonic Anglo-Saxon exploitation and the Red Beast.' 53 The Nazi vision of European harmony was contrasted with the alleged aggression, treachery, cynicism, selfishness of the 'plutocratic cultures' of England and America. 54 In addition, frequent references were made to the prewar discourses of British benevolence as various authors dejectedly announced their disappointment with the 'quasi-friend' who had always only been interested in fomenting discord among and within
European states, and acted as a 'dark, destructive force' throughout the history of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. 55 England was portrayed as a 'hyena that sucks blood and life out of all other nations on its way.' Her history was 'full of unspeakable crimes' which testified to its eternal amorality and barbarism.
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In fact, as the Belgrade daily Novo Vreme established, England was now the 'eternal enemy of Europe', and continued its attempts to prevent Germany from completing its 'European task'. Soon after the Third Reich's attack on the Soviet Union, the Serbian collaborationist press began insisting that Victoria 'not only signified Germany's certain victory but was also a sign, clearer than ever, of the victory of the entire European continent', because Germany fought 'for Europe and in the interests of Europe.' Europe was finally united, finally emerging from slumber and growing aware of itself and its importance, and this was proven by the 'flood of volunteers' from all over the continent who yearned to fight for the German forces. Moreover, the pan-European support for the German actions was portrayed as a 'plebiscite', with ordinary people from Norway and Holland, Poland, Serbia and Bulgaria rejoicing at the rebirth of Europe under the new banner of Germany's unprecedented triumph. 57 The wave of hopefulness and great expectations of German victory was said to have enveloped both Eastern and
Western Europe, bonding all in their wish for rejuvenation through German arms. Importantly, unlike the old liberal Europe with its complicated system of exclusions and inclusions, this rejuvenated continent 'made place for every ethnic or natural historical specificity in a common defence.'
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Another factor introducing serious and disorienting changes into the previous discourse based on the East-West dichotomy was the need to refer to Japan as an ally, glorify its foreign policy aims and rhetoric, and talk about its 'different' culture and civilization in exceptionally affirmative terms.
With Japan, the East-West conceptual divide received its final blow. Not only was the West not necessarily superior; not only was the East in the specific case of Bolshevism and the Soviet Union absolutely identical in its evil and barbarous nature to the erstwhile symbol of Western civilization. Europe' thus shifted dramatically, and it was the German-inspired combination of socialist and nationalist revolutions that constituted the modern spirit of Europe, which would preserve the glory of the continent and revive its moribund cultural, economic and political potentials. 67 Ironically, these geocultural and geo-political adjustments, which apparently moved beyond rigid civilizational dichotomies, encouraged a range of Serbian collaborationist intellectuals to speculate about the possible inclusiveness of the New Europe, a notion that proved to be painfully misguided. accomplishments. Moreover, some of the most significant artists, whose creations must be viewed as the cornerstones of European art and whose style, mastery and influences determined and directed the work of later European artistic geniuses, actually often came from Asia, the Oriental cultures and, most notably, from Syria. These Eastern influences then helped form the common European consciousness and legacy, the Eastern cultural/artistic element being undeniably present at Europe's cultural roots and in its identity. 69 In the specifically Serbian context, these dramatic changes transformed how various intellectuals, politicians and journalists wrote about Serbia, its role in Europe and its relationship to its own national legacies. One of the central difficulties facing the Nedic government was its problematic reputation among the population and the powerful and convincing propaganda denouncing it as a group of quislings and traitors. Tomasevich, for instance, cites a 1942 memorandum, 'signed by the entire cabinet,' which pointed out that, 'because the government had been established by the Germans, it appeared to be a German tool. Therefore, the accusations of London and Moscow propaganda that it was a puppet government found credence among some Serbs.' 70 It was a particularly difficult position for the government to make sense of to the population, given the brutal nature of the occupation regime, the German conduct in Europe as well as the Nazi ideology with its view of Slavs as Untermenschen.
If any of the government's goals were to be accomplished -most notably, the end to sabotage activities targeting the Nazi apparatus inside the country -it needed to formulate a convincing response to such accusations. This new discourse was also in a direct relationship with the prewar debates on the topic, since essentially the same questions, dilemmas, problems, left unresolved, had to be addressed again.
The prewar discourse of Serbia, its national identity and its place in Europe depended to a large extent on the firmness of the East-West dichotomy. With that dichotomy now seriously shaken, novel solutions and combinations appeared.
The stress now was on preserving the purity of national cultural traditions, returning to the 'sources of national spirit' and protecting those from any foreign (i.e. mostly Western) contamination.
The discourse of national authenticity now directly referred to the prewar debates on modernization and Westernization, condemning 'the path to Europe' that those had proposed. The interwar calls for imitating the West and casting off national traditions deemed 'Eastern' and therefore worthless -all these core elements of the late 1930s intellectual discussions were now identified as the sources of evil and decay. Instead of developing and honouring their own national ideas, Serbs 'proclaimed them worthless and shameful, even empty phrases.' 71 For Nedic himself, the New Serbia had to have 'roots solely in the national soul and traditional national consciousness.' Minister of Education Jonic also welcomed the new European and global system in which it would be possible for a 'small nation to live and work following its own specific and authentic path and destiny, and at the same time to be universally recognized and respected.' This new politics of authenticity meant that 'building our own Serbian soul, and our own Serbian ideal,' was the chief aim. 72 The source of the nation's political as well as moral catastrophe was in the fact that 'for twenty years we had been abandoning Serbia', while the Serbian youth 'had been seduced by all those winds and rages, both Western and Eastern.' 73 All solutions and answers were already extant within the 'well of the Serbian national soul,'
and were accordingly to be found only if the nation remained loyal to its own historical authenticity. It was recommended that the Serbian nation's cultural work be protected, indeed isolated, from all outside influences and interferences that could harm its authentic development. On the other hand, there were constant references to the need to build and rebuild, to renovate, to progress, better the nation, even modernize, to achieve certain standards. But the very task of modernization was conceptualized as, so to speak, backward-oriented, i.e. it was the return of a "de-nationalized" people and culture to their own national "essences" and authentic national character that was to constitute progress ("Serbia's new road on old historical paths"). As law student Slobodan Jankovic wrote in 1942, the Serbian youth needed to go back and 're-read more often its national history and its uncontaminated national past, when great national fighters had lived.' 74 This rediscovery of what Ljotic termed the 'old imperial path' of Serbia was certain to make the Serbian nation and state "truly modern," and apt for their tasks in the New European Order. 75 Moreover, the new Serbian homeland would need to be set up on 'healthy peasant foundations, cemented with one common will and inspired with one unique Serbian soul', and it would be thereby reinforced against all pernicious 'artificial creations' such as Western influences. As Nedic confirmed at his meeting with a group of peasant youth before they were sent to Germany on an educational tour 'to get acquainted with German agriculture', the new Serbian state would be called the 'Serbian peasant cooperative state', and would be based exclusively on the organizations and cultural traditions of the revived and renovated Serbian countryside. 76 Given this rejection of cities, universities, parliaments as degenerate, foreign, morally dirty and contaminated, it was not surprising that New Serbia in the New European Order was to be exceptionally inward-looking yet profoundly European:
patriarchal, traditional and at the same time more avidly international and progressive than ever before.
This anti-international internationalism was one of the most striking and persistent ideas of the wartime years, and the collaborationist intelligentsia undertook to invent such authentic and nationally 'pure' traditions to fit it.
Such understanding of progress and modernity rejected the linear vision of advancement and civilization, inherent in the prewar Westernization debates: ''Patriots' believed in the 'progress of humankind' that unmistakably increases with time, so that every generation must be more 'advanced' than the previous ones... According to them, laws and conviction of national life are not only malleable but one nation needs to 'look up to the advanced,' and not only learn from them how to build roads, railways and canals, but also must imitate their customs, habits, convictions, language, thoughts, faith.'
As the only healthy alternative, Ljotic suggested that 'every nation must find its own way, convictions and laws of its own life and hold to them persistently, since without that essence it falls into decay and encounters its own death and destruction.' 77 Coupled with this, and equally frequently referred to, was the insistence on Serbia's European membership and its international role under the novel circumstances. In addition, in a number of writings, the Ottoman past was talked about in "normalized" terms of politics and geography rather than culture and civilization. Collaborationist discourses rarely mentioned the Empire's inherent backwardness, and 'Turkey' and 'Austria' were constructed as entities of essentially similar cultural and political characters (and, hence, legacies). Furthermore, as one author asserted, writing on 'novel aspects' of the history of German-Serbian diplomatic relations, there were no fundamental distinctions between the Ottoman Empire and Bismarck's Germany either, and no relationship of inferiority-superiority. Serbia was to take its new place 'in the Orient,' 'inheriting and assuming Turkey's position' in relation to Germany, and this was certainly not seen to contain any negative cultural or civilizational implications. 82 Ljotic also introduced a rather positive discourse of the Ottoman Empire, a peculiar redemption of its values. He attempted to redefine some aspects of the national mythology to suit his purposes and projected self-image, comparing the Nedic government with the "admirable" and "tragic" state of affairs in the "Serbian lands" following the Kosovo battle and preceding the Ottoman takeover, and consequently, comparing the two "great and powerful"
conquerors -the Ottoman Empire and the Third Reich. 83 
Conclusion
The centrality of the conceptual East-West dichotomy determined the interwar debates regarding possibilities and directions for Serbia's and Yugoslavia's modernization. The problem of preserving national authenticity and historical cultural identity while implementing reforms that would bring the state closer to the Western standards proved to be a very difficult one, and it bred multiple frustrations regarding the viability of modernization and progress.
The wartime puppet regime of Milan Nedic continued to address many of the same issues and problems under the radically transformed circumstances. The anti-imperialist rhetoric dictated by the general line of the Nazi propaganda introduced the possibility of viewing the 'East' and non-European, even non-Christian, territories as the bearers of superiority and exceptional cultural/civilizational value.
The Serbian press adopted the Nazi discourse on Japan, India, Africa, the Middle East, according to which Western influences and elements were the ones with backward and detrimental consequences.
This profoundly reshaped how these wartime journalists and intellectuals wrote about Europe and its cultural legacies and roots. Many authors started to write of the East-West cultural, racial and ethnic interpénétrations as having had an enormous formative influence on the creation of a common European cultural/artistic/civilizational consciousness. It was paradoxical that this discourse of cultural mixing as a valuable and positive asset should emerge under the occupation of a power which placed the imperative of racial purity at the core of its ideology.
Nazism's ideological anti-Westernness certainly influenced the above-described shifts in the the Nazi project of a New Europe appeared to inspire at least some confidence: as historian Vasa
Kazimirovic concluded, Nedic 'believed that he would eventually be able ...to be the leader of an independent Serbia within Hitler's new order in Europe.'
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The Nazi rhetoric of the New Order offered novel solutions within radically different intellectual and political parameters. Moreover, a young East European society which had faced dire political, economic and intellectual difficulties in the crisis-ridden interwar years saw it not only as an inescapable, violently imposed reality but also as an opportunity to join the European family of nations
